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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 16-3788 & 17-1562 
___________ 
 
EDWIN JACQUET,  




WARDEN FORT DIX FCI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. Civ. No. 1-16-cv-04368) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 17, 2017 
 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 







 Pro se appellant Edwin Jacquet appeals the District Court’s orders denying his 
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and denying his motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).  We 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings (including an 
evidentiary hearing). 
 Jacquet is a federal prisoner.  In 2012, he pleaded guilty in the Southern District of 
New York to conspiracy to commit bank fraud and was sentenced to 63 months’ 
imprisonment.  He earned a 12-month sentence reduction for participating in the 
Residential Drug Abuse Program and approximately 172 days of good-time credit.  After 
serving 32 months, he was transferred to a halfway house to complete his sentence. 
 Jacquet claims that, while in the halfway house, his mother and sister visited him, 
bringing a box of Nature Valley Lemon Poppy Seed Breakfast Biscuits.  Jacquet says that 
he ate six of these biscuits before realizing that they contained poppy seeds.  Jacquet 
feared that eating these poppy seeds could trigger a positive urinalysis result on one of 
the random drug tests to which he was subjected.  He thus informed Rohan, a staff 
member at his halfway house, that he had eaten the biscuits; Rohan assured him that it 
would not be a problem.  Nevertheless, at 10:30 that night, LabCorp conducted a 
urinalysis drug test.  Jacquet tested positive for codeine and morphine.   
 On the day that it received the result of this test (October 13, 2015), the halfway 
house issued an incident report charging Jacquet with using narcotics.  That day, Jacquet 
met with a staff member.  Jacquet denied the charge, blamed it on the poppy seeds, asked 
for a retest or a hair test, and requested that Rohan be interviewed.  On October 14, 2015, 
the Center Discipline Committee held a hearing on the charge.  The parties dispute 
whether Jacquet was physically present at this hearing.  Relying on the results of the 
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urinalysis test, the Committee found Jacquet guilty of the offense.  The Committee 
recommended that Jacquet be returned to a more-secure facility and that he be stripped of 
his good-time credit; the next day (October 15, 2015), he was transferred to a detention 
center.  Also on October 15, 2015, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) revoked Jacquet’s 12-
month sentence credit.  On November 4, 2015, a hearing officer sanctioned Jacquet to the 
loss of 85 days of good time. 
 After making protracted but unsuccessful efforts to challenge the BOP’s decisions 
and to obtain hair-follicle testing, Jacquet, through counsel, filed a § 2241 petition.1  In 
his petition, he provided a wealth of citations in support of his contention that the 
consumption of poppy seeds can cause positive urinalysis results for codeine and 
morphine and that a hair test would eliminate this type of “false positive.”  He alleged 
that his due process rights had been violated in a variety of ways.  The District Court 
denied each of his claims, and Jacquet filed a timely notice of appeal.  That appeal has 
been docketed at C.A. No. 16-3788.  Jacquet also filed a Rule 59(e) motion, which the 
District Court denied.  Jacquet appealed that order; this appeal has been docketed at C.A. 
No. 17-1562.  The Clerk consolidated these two appeals. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Jacquet’s due-process 
challenge to the disciplinary hearing was properly brought under § 2241 because it 
entailed the loss of good-time credits.  See Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (per curiam).  We review the District Court’s denial of habeas relief de novo 
                                              
1 The Government waived any exhaustion defense.  See Gov’t Resp. to § 2241 Petition at 
pg. 5 n.5. 
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and its factual findings for clear error.  Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 
2013).  We review the District Court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of 
discretion.  See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 
673 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 While Jacquet raised numerous claims before the District Court, he has presented 
only three in his opening brief, and we thus limit ourselves to reviewing those three 
claims.  See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 849 F.3d 540, 555 n.13 (3d Cir. 2017).  Of 
these three arguments, Jacquet focuses primarily on his contention that the Community 
Based Program Agreement — which set forth the terms and conditions of his pre-release 
transfer to the halfway house — is an unenforceable contract of adhesion.  However, he 
presented this argument for the first time in his Rule 59(e) motion.  The District Court 
denied the claim on the ground that Rule 59(e) motions are appropriate only to rectify 
plain errors of law or to offer newly discovered evidence, and may not be used to assert 
new arguments that could have been raised earlier.  The District Court did not err in so 
holding.  See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008); Max’s 
Seafood Café, 176 F.3d at 677.2 
 Next, Jacquet argues that he was excluded from the disciplinary hearing in 
derogation of his due process rights.  The District Court rejected this claim, concluding 
                                              
2 Jacquet blames his attorney for failing to press this claim earlier, but “[t]he remedy in a 
civil case, in which chosen counsel is negligent, is an action for malpractice,” not an 
appeal.  Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 1980) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Nelson v. Boeing Co., 446 F.3d 1118, 1119 (10th Cir. 
2006) (“The general rule in civil cases is that the ineffective assistance of counsel is not a 
basis for appeal or retrial.”). 
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both that Jacquet had been physically present and that, in any case, he had not been 
prejudiced.  We conclude that the District Court should not have disposed of this claim 
without holding an evidentiary hearing.   
 Turning first to the factual question of whether Jacquet was excluded from this 
hearing, as the District Court explained, the Government offered some evidence that 
Jacquet had been present — he placed his initials on a report from the hearing next to 
statements setting forth the time and date of the hearing and that he had been advised of 
various rights, and, while he filed a variety of administrative grievances and appeals, he 
never previously alleged that he had been excluded.  However, Jacquet also squarely 
asserted, in both his verified § 2241 petition and his reply brief, that he had not been 
present.  We conclude that, in these circumstances, the Government’s evidence was not 
so strong as to permit the District Court to reject Jacquet’s allegations and resolve the 
factual dispute without first holding an evidentiary hearing.  See generally Zettlemoyer v. 
Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 301 (3d Cir. 1991) (“A district court must hold a hearing if the 
petitioner has alleged facts that, if proved, would entitle him or her to relief and an 
evidentiary hearing is necessary to establish the truth of those allegations.”). 
 The District Court also ruled that, even if Jacquet had been excluded, he was not 
prejudiced because the BOP was already familiar with his consumption-of-poppy-seeds 
defense.  However, this analysis undervalues the importance of Jacquet’s presence at the 
hearing.  His entire defense depended on the BOP’s finding credible his explanation that 
his positive urinalysis test was caused by his consumption of poppy seeds; given the 
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importance of his credibility, a written or second-hand statement would be a poor 
substitute for in-person testimony.  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) 
(stating, in a benefits-termination case, that “where credibility and veracity are at 
issue . . .  written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision”); Wheeler v. 
Sims, 951 F.2d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that oral testimony is superior to written 
statements in prison-disciplinary proceedings “for the vast majority of prisoners are not 
well educated and thus are better able to express themselves orally than in writing”).  
Moreover, being excluded from the hearing would have prevented Jacquet from 
monitoring the Government’s presentation of evidence and otherwise administering his 
defense.  Thus, we conclude that the District Court also erred in denying this claim for 
lack of prejudice.  We will therefore vacate the District Court’s judgment as to this claim 
and remand for an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual dispute concerning whether 
Jacquet was physically present at the hearing.   
 Jacquet’s final argument is that the BOP violated his due process rights by 
denying his request to obtain hair-testing evidence at his own expense.  The Supreme 
Court has held that an inmate facing the loss of good-time credits has a due process right 
to “present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be 
unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.”  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 
U.S. 539, 566 (1974); see also Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1399 (3d Cir. 1991).  
“Although prison officials are afforded deference regarding whether evidence might be 
unduly hazardous or undermine institutional safety or correctional goals, ‘the discretion 
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afforded prison officials is not without limits.’”  Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 
163, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Young, 926 F.2d at 1400).  Thus, we typically require 
prison officials to “determine whether there are legitimate penological reasons to deny 
the prisoner access to the evidence requested.”  Id. at 174.  Here, the Government has 
presented no evidence whatsoever detailing its rationale for preventing Jacquet from 
obtaining hair-testing evidence.  We will therefore vacate the District Court’s order as to 
this claim and remand the matter to the District Court for it to determine whether the 
BOP had a legitimate basis to deny Jacquet access to this secondary testing.  
 Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment as to Jacquet’s claims 
that the BOP violated his due process rights by (a) excluding him from the hearing and 
(b) denying hair testing, and will remand for further proceedings as to these claims.  On 
remand, the District Court should conduct an evidentiary hearing as to claim (a).  In all 
other respects, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.    
